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NOTES
UPDATING EMINENT DOMAIN FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing concern with ecology and pollution control has in-
creased the attention given environmental law in Florida and else-
where. The newly-established Florida Department of Environmental
Regulation" and such recent legislation as the Environmental Land
and Water Management Act of 19722 and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 19693 evidence the heightened concern.
Eminent domain-the power to take private property for public
use without the owner's consent-has long been used as a tool for en-
vironmental improvement. Much of Florida's park and forest land was
acquired through the exercise of municipal, county, state, or federal
eminent domain. Condemnation, however, has evolved as a rather
inflexible means of environmental control. This traditional method of
imposing the public's will on private property interests may be in-
adequate in its present form to satisfy growing ecological demands.
Land use regulations-the other major means of subordinating private
property interests to the public will-have proven a somewhat success-
ful alternative. But as discussed later,4 regulation poses its own prob-
lems.
Despite its long and widespread use, the exercise of eminent do-
main for environmental purposes is a widely-debated topic in Florida.
Each year new eminent domain legislation is proposed.5 The most re-
cently enacted Florida legislation is a local act6 granting the governor
and cabinet limited powers to exercise eminent domain to save en-
vironmentally endangered lands in Volusia County.7 At the same time,
1. FLA. STAT. § 20.261 (1975).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.12 (1975).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347 (1970).
4. See text accompanying notes 55-57 infra.
5. Eminent domain legislation proposed for the 1975 regular session included bills
which would provide for revisions of eminent domain compensation procedures (Fla. S.
128 (1975); Fla. H.R. 1895 (1975)); new procedures to be followed by the Division of
Recreation and Parks relating to eminent domain (Fla. S. 5, 816 (1975); Fla. H.R. 1501,
1854 (1975)); and acquisition of environmentally endangered lands by the Governor and
Cabinet. Only the last proposal was passed by both houses; the others died in committee.
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 259.01-.07 (1975).
7. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-251 provides:
(d) The board is empowered and authorized to acquire by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, in accordance with chapter 73, any land or water areas,
related resources and property, and any and all rights, title and interest in
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stricter land use regulations are proposed and passed each year. Their
implementation raises potential conflicts between efforts at environ-
mental protection and the need to preserve individual property rights.
Opposition to strict environmental regulation is growing. 8
In response to the controversy surrounding the two practices,
Governor Askew appointed a Property Rights Study Commission 9 in
December 1974. The Commission was directed to develop policy guide-
lines to aid in the determination of where " 'the private prerogative
should end and where the public prerogative should begin' relative
to property rights." 1° The Commission's recommendations were sub-
mitted in a final report in March 1975.
This current activity will significantly affect the nature and applica-
tion of eminent domain. This note focuses on the present use and
shortcomings of environmental eminent domain and land use regula-
tion, suggests future developments based on current trends, and sum-
marizes the recommendations of the Governor's Property Rights Study
Commission.
II. ExISTING EMINENT DOMAIN PROVISIONS
The Florida Legislature has granted certain authorities limited
powers to exercise eminent domain. It has delegated condemnation
such land or water areas, related resources and other property in the Volusia
recharge area lying and being in Volusia County, Florida, and containing ap-
proximately 3,100 acres....
... Expenditures incurred by acquisitions pursuant to this paragraph shall not
exceed the two hundred million dollars for state capital projects authorized in §
259.02, Florida Statutes. No eminent domain proceeding for the project specified
herein shall be commenced after July 1, 1977.
As originally proposed, Fla. H.R. 193 (1975) would have granted much broader powers:
(d) The board is empowered and authorized to acquire by the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, in accordance with chapter 73, any land or water
areas, related resources and property, and any and all rights, title and interest in
such land or water areas, related resources and other property which it determines
to be reasonably necessary for the execution of the comprehensive plan for the
conservation and protection of environmentally endangered lands in this state.
8. For example, in January 1975, State Commissioner of Agriculture Doyle Conner
called for a six-month moratorium on state acquisition of endangered lands because
Governor Askew had failed to "formulate a plan of relief" for property owners who are
denied the use of their land without compensation through environmental protection
regulations; his effort failed. Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 3, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
9. The Commission, which was established by Executive Order 74-71 (Dec. 20,
1974), was composed of 26 legislators and private citizens having knowledge in the
fields of law, taxation, property development, environmental protection, and agriculture.
The Commission began its ten-week effort on December 30, 1974, and submitted a final
report containing recommendations on March 17, 1975.
10. GOVERNOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
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authority to counties," municpalities,'12 school boards,"3 the Depart-
ment of Transportation,'1 railroad and canal companies,'5 and the
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.16 The Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure and chapters 73 and 74 of the Florida Statutes provide
the general procedures these agencies are to follow. 17
Separate statutes provide for the exercise of eminent domain to pre-
serve state forests, 8 historical districts, 19 land or water areas for out-
door recreation and conservation, 20 and to control junkyards.2x The
Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, pro-
vides for agencies with condemnation authority to purchase land22 and
specifically authorizes the exercise of eminent domain in the Big Cypress
Swamp while designating it an area of critical state concern.23 Eminent
domain is not presently available in Florida for wilderness land preser-
PROPERTY RIGrTS STUDY COMMISSION, March 17, 1975, at 2 (unpublished report in State
of Florida Legislative Library) [hereinafter cited as PROPERTY RIGHTs REPORT].
11. FLA. STAT. §§ 127.01-.02 (1975).
12. FLA. STAT. § 166.401 (1975).
13. FLA. STAT. § 235.05 (1975).
14. FLA. STAT. § 337.27 (1975).
15. FLA. STAT. § 360.02 (1975).
16. FLA. STAT. § 253.02(4) (1975). The power of the Trustees of the Internal Im-
provement fund have been transferred to the Department of Natural Resources. Fla. Laws
1975, ch. 75-22, § 10, 15.
17. Federal eminent domain is exercised for environmental objectives under limit-
ing statutes similar to those used by the state. The Coastal Zone Management Act, 16
U.S.C.A. § 1455(d)(2) (1974), provides:
Such authority shall include power-to acquire fee simple and less than fee simple
interests in lands, waters, and other property through condemnation or other
means when necessary to achieve conformance with the management program.
Under the provision establishing national forests, 16 U.S.C. § 517 (1970) provides:
The Secretary of Agriculture may do all things necessary to secure the safe title
in the United States to the lands to be acquired ....
18. FLA. STAT. § 589.27 (1975).
19. See FA. STAT. § 266.06(7), .106(7), .115(7), .206(7) (1975).
20. FLA. STAT. § 375.031(6) (1975).
21. FLA. STAT. § 339.241(5) (1975).
22. FLA. STAT. § 380.08(2) (1975) provides:
If any governmental agency authorized to adopt a rule or regulation or issue any
order under this chapter shall determine that, to achieve the purposes of this
chapter, it is in the public interest to acquire the fee simple or lesser interest in
any parcel of land, such agency shall so certify to the state land planning agency,
the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, and other ap-
propriate government agencies.
23. FLA. STAT. § 380.055(7) (1975) provides:
The Governor and cabinet as the head of the Department of Natural Resources are
empowered and authorized to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent
domain any land or water areas and related resources and property ... lying within
the boundaries of the Big Cypress Area.
[Vlol. 4:24
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vation; however, statutes in that area provide for the purchase of land
without the exercise of eminent domain.
24
The legislature has delegated the power to condemn land for
parks and recreational uses to municipal and county governments; no
specific provision authorizes the state to do the same. Governor Askew
has asked the legislature to return that power to the state.
25
III. PRESENT OPERATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain is sometimes said to be based on the idea that
the sovereign retains ownership of all land and can resume possession
whenever the public interest so requires.26 Although eminent domain
is considered an "inherent power" of the state, and therefore exists
independent of constitutional authorization,2 7 it is subject to federal
and state constitutional limitations. The fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution mandates that just compensation be provided when
eminent domain is exercised; it also requires that the power be
exercised only for a public use. 28 That amendment's "taking clause"
has been adopted in article X of the Florida Constitution.2
When the "public use" issue is contested,30 the courts require a
24. FLA. STAT. § 258.23(1) (1975).
25. In his opening address to the 1975 Regular Session of the Florida Legislature,
Governor Askew said:
In our purchase of lands for the State, we have too often been forced to buy
only what was most available, and not what was most desirable. I urge you to
give to the state a power already exercised by the cities and counties . . . the
power of eminent domain in the acquisition of parks and recreational lands.
Tallahassee Democrat, Apr. 8, 1975, at 3, col. 1. This request ultimately was denied by
the legislature. See note 5 supra.
26. Daniels v. State Road Dep't, 170 So. 2d 846, 848 (Fla. 1964).
27. See Kohl v. United States 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875); Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v.
Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1947).
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." "Public use" and "public purpose" are used interchangeably
in Florida case law.
29. FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 6(a) provides:
No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full com-
pensation therefor paid to each owner ....
30. One of the most-quoted definitions of "public use" is found in Demeter Land
Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Co., 128 So. 402, 406 (Fla. 1930), where the court stated:
A use to be public must be fixed and definite. It must be one in which the
public, as such, has an interest, and the terms and manner of its enjoyment must
be within the control of the State, independent of the rights of the private owner
of the property appropriated to the use. The use of property cannot be said to
be public if it can be gainsaid, denied, or withdrawn by the owner. The public
interest must dominate the private gain.
Acceptable "public uses" include highways, slum clearance projects, drainage of swamps,
flood control projects, public water supplies, public buildings, airports, parking facilities,
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showing that the taking is a public necessity.31 The test can be met
either by a legislative act declaring necessity, 2 or specific evidence
proving the need for a particular purchase. 33 In one case a park's
necessity was established by a showing that 250,000 residents lived
within an 8-mile radius of the proposed site with no existing
park. 34 The state may not condemn property, however, if the necessity
is created entirely by nonresidents. 35
In general, the condemning authority enjoys broad discretion in
deciding what particular property the public needs, 6 and the type of
interest required. It can take a fee simple even if the necessity is only
temporary and a lesser interest in the land would be sufficient. 7
schools, utilities, etc. A use may be public although it will be enjoyed by a comparatively
small number of people as long as the use is open on equal terms to all so situated
as to enjoy the privilege. Wilton v. St. Johns County, 123 So. 527, 534 (Fla. 1929).
31. See Ball v. City of Tallahassee, 281 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1973); Brest v. Jacksonville
Expressway Authority, 194 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
32. See Marvin v. Housing Authority, 183 So. 145 (Fla. 1938). In this case Fla. Laws
1937, ch. 17981 declared the necessity for exercising eminent domain for slum clearance
projects:
Section 2. Finding and Declaration of Necessity.-It is hereby declared:
(a) that there exist in the State insanitary or unsafe dwelling accommodations and
that persons of low income are forced to reside in such . . . accommodations; that
within the State there is a shortage of safe or sanitary dwelling accommodations
available at rents which persons of low income can afford . . . ; that the aforesaid
conditions cause an increase and spread of disease and crime .
(d) that it is in the public interest that work on projects for such purposes be
commenced as soon as possible in order to relieve unemployment which now
constitutes an emergency; and the necessity in the public interest for the pro-
vision hereinafter enacted, is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determina-
tion.
33. Where the legislature has not declared a necessity, the question of necessity is
a judicial one. The necessity need not be absolute, but only one that is reasonable.
Wilton v. St. Johns County, 123 So. 527, 535 (Fla. 1929).
34. Dade County v. Paxson, 270 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). In this
case a certified resolution of the Dade County Commission deemed the taking of
three parcels of land necessary for the creation of Black Point Park. The Third District
Court of Appeal said that the condemning authority is not required to prove "absolute"
necessity when there appears in the record proof of some "reasonable necessity" for
the taking. The court upheld the taking of the two larger parcels but denied con-
demnation of a third parcel, a one-acre lot somewhat removed from the main body of
the proposed park, saying "that an acquiring authority will not be permitted to take
a greater quantity of property . .. than is necessary to serve the particular public use for
which [it] is being acquired." Id. at 459.
35. Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In this
case Gulf Power Co. petitioned to condemn land in Florida for the construction of a
transmission line to supply power for the exclusive use of Georgia residents. The court
held that "property in one state cannot be condemned for the sole purpose of serving a
public use in another state." Id. at 371.
36. Staplin v. Canal Authority, 208 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
37. Wright v. Dade County, 216 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied,
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Methods of valuing condemned land vary.38 The condemnee should
receive the " 'fair actual market value at the time of the lawful appro-
priation,' "39 including compensation for improvements and fixtures. 40
This value, which is determined by jury in Florida4 1 is usually expressed
as the amount that a willing purchaser under no compulsion to buy
would pay for the property.42 Special damages, such as moving costs
4
1
and business losses,44 are also awarded.
In Florida, market value is generally based on the highest and
best actual or reasonably possible use of the property.45 Some courts
in other states have expressed this standard as the most profitable use
to which the land can reasonably be put in the near future." Develop-
225 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970).
38. See Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1972). The
trial court dismissed the eminent domain proceedings in this case because the county
had, in the court's opinion, committed itself to a particular valuation technique
(capitalization of earnings) which the court felt was improper. The Supreme Court of
Florida reversed, saying that the trial court was premature in making a pronouncement
on the proper method of valuation since the method depends on the particular cir-
cumstances of the case, and those circumstances were not yet known.
39. Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 182 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) citing Sunday v. Louisville c N. R.R., 57 So. 351 (Fla. 1912).
40. See, e.g., Meyers v. Daytona Beach, 30 So. 2d 354, 355 (Fla. 1947). See also 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 175(1) (1965); 12 FLA. JuR. Eminent Domain § 98 (1957).
41. FLA. STAT. § 73.071 (1975).
42. See Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 182 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
43. See Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry DuPree Co., 108 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1958).
44. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1975) provides:
(3) The jury shall determine solely the amount of compensation to be paid, which
compensation shall include:
(b) Where less than the entire property is sought to be appropriated, ... and
the effect of the taking of the property involved may damage or destroy an es-
tablished business of more than 5 years' standing, owned by the party whose
lands are being so taken, . . . the probable damages to such business which the
denial of the use of the property so taken may reasonably cause ....
45. See State Road Dep't V. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963). In this case the
threat of condemnation restricted the uses the owner could make of his property in
the interim before the actual taking. The court said it would be unfair to base the
compensation for the property on the value of such restricted use. See also Board of
Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla.
1959). Here the court would not allow the valuation to be based on the fact that the
property was adaptable to use as business properties since a zoning ordinance limited
it to residential use.
46. See United States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962). In this case the most
"profitable" use of a portion of the land to be acquired was the cultivation of marketable
sod. The decision of the district court was vacated and remanded by the Fourth Circuit
because it was not clear from the record that that use had been adequately considered.
Id. at 305.
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ment potential is an important factor in valuation, but purely specula-
tive uses are not considered. 47 Where a zoning ordinance or other regu-
lation limits the land's uses, only those uses permitted by the regula-
tion need be considered. 48
Although the landowner is paid for existing improvements and
fixtures, he may not build on the land to increase his compensation
after he has been advised that the land is to be condemned.45 A state
might, for environmental reasons, use this rule to slow development by
simply announcing an intention to condemn land in the future. The
courts, however, would probably not allow any long-range control in
this manner.50
IV. DRAWBACKS OF THE PRESENT EMINENT DOMAIN CONCEPT
AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
In the past, eminent domain has been a somewhat effective tool
for protecting parks, forests, and wildlife refuges from private de-
velopment; however, its exercise cannot meet the present demand
for wide-scale environmental controls. Property is expensive; land
47. See Rochelle v. State Road Dep't, 196 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
The respondent landowner in this case testified that she had bought the land in question
for speculation because she had heard that a Florida Turnpike exit would be located
at the site. Although the information was true (this was a proceeding to purchase land
for that exit), the jury was not allowed to consider that speculative use in determining
the land's value. Id. at 478. See also Board of Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee
Bank & Trust Co., 100 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1958). In this case the First
District Court of Appeal listed the criteria for determining whether a use is too specu-
lative:
To warrant admission of testimony as to the value for purposes other than that
to which the land is being put, or to which its use is limited by ordinance at the
time of the taking, the landowner must first show: (1) that the property is adaptable
to the other use, (2) that it is reasonably probable that it will be put to the other
use within the immediate future, or within a reasonable time, (3) that the market
value of the land has been enhanced by the other use for which it is adaptable.
Id. at 69.
48. Langston v. Miami Beach, 242 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971). In con-
demning land for an oceanfront park, the fact that there was no probability that the
property would be rezoned for a higher economic use made it unnecessary for
the jury to consider those uses when determining value. But see text accompanying
notes 73, 74 infra.
49. See Cook v. Di Domenico, 135 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). In this
case Dade County had listed the landowner's property as a prospective highway site. Con-
struction on the land was permitted only if the landowner waived his right to compensa-
tion for such improvements in event of a later condemnation, The Third District Court
of Appeal approved of the principle behind the requirement, but upheld the issuance
of a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of a building permit without waiver of com-
pensation because the condemnation had been proposed 9 years earlier and construc-
tion did not seem likely to begin soon. Id. at 246.
50. See notes 74-79 and accompanying text inIra.
[Vol. 4:24
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values are rising and inflation rates are high. State and federal funds
available for land purchases are hardly adequate to purchase the vast
areas necessary for environmental protection. For example, in 1973 the
Florida Coastal Coordinating Council identified almost 1 million
acres of privately owned coastal wetlands that should be preserved.51
Because improvements are included in valuation, land purchase
prices in fast-developing areas soon become too high for effective use
of eminent domain. Yet these are often the areas with the greatest
need for public facilities such as beaches and parks. In order to pur-
chase and preserve lands in an overdeveloping area, the government
ends up financing precisely what it seeks to prevent. If possible, the
government condemns the least developed land in the area since it is
also the least expensive.
When eminent domain is exercised to preserve beachlands, the
stretches of beach with the most extensive residential, commercial,
and industrial development-those most damaging to the quality of
the environment-are left untouched. Landowners who exercise re-
straint in developing their property, and therefore cause the least en-
vironmental damage, find their lands condemned, and must sell at prices
far below those enjoyed by their less cautious neighbors. 52 Where
landowners anticipate that the state or federal government plans to
preserve certain areas, they may even accelerate development to avoid
having their land selected for condemnation.
Eminent domain as presently practiced reflects the view that any
land development is good and that society is better served by "im-
proved" than undeveloped land.53 Viewed from this perspective, un-
developed land is "wasteful," and therefore the owner should receive
less compensation. But attitudes toward land use are changing. Today
many people view development as an evil rather than as a service to
society, and undeveloped land is not always considered a waste. The
actual value of natural beaches, unobstructed water recharge areas, and
unmolested mangrove swamps is just beginning to be fully appreciated.
As that appreciation grows, attitudes change toward such "improve-
ments" as sea walls, parking lots, and land fill projects that directly
51. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 314 (1973), citing
testimony of Bruce Johnson, Executive Director, Coastal Coordinating Council, before
the Florida Environmental Land Management Study Committee, Jan. 31, 1973.
52. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
53. The valuation scheme discussed in text accompanying note 40 supra, takes into
consideration improvements and fixtures to the land. Paying an additional amount for
any improvements reflects an underlying premise that developed land is of greater value
to the state than undeveloped land. One who has developed his land is rewarded by
higher compensation.
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interfere with the natural functions of property. Viewed from this
new perspective, it is anomalous to compensate a landowner for im-
provements that are either of no service or a detriment to society.
Similarly, it is illogical to pay reduced compensation to those owners
who have served society by preserving the environment. If eminent
domain is to become a more effective tool for environmental control, it
must somehow incorporate these changing values and attitudes. A
possible approach would be to categorize permitted but noncom-
pensable uses by statute.
V. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF EMINENT DOMAIN
AND LAND USE REGULATION
Compensation is required only when land is taken. Government
actions which injure property or decrease its value but fall short of a
taking (a judicial determination made on a case-by-case basis) are
usually not compensable. 54 Since most land use regulations fall into
this category, they can be far less expensive than eminent domain pro-
ceedings. Zoning ordinances are an example.
Land use regulations, though, have shortcomings which prevent
their completely replacing eminent demain as an environmental tool.
While regulations effect land control at less cost than does eminent
domain, the extent of control is limited.55 Only eminent domain can
assure that the land is not used for any purpose.56 Eminent domain
has two other advantages over land use regulation. It can spread the
cost of saving environmentally endangered lands over all of society
rather than burdening only the individual landowner. And it is un-
affected by statutory limitations on the extent of land regulation per-
mitted for specific purposes.57 Despite these limitations, regulations
used in conjunction with, or in place of, the exercise of eminent domain
can provide more efficient and less costly environmental control than
can condemnation alone.
A. General Scope of Land Use Regulation
Land use regulation is valid under a state's police power if it
54. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); State Plant Bd.
v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1959).
55. See notes 80-97 and accompanying text inIra.
56. Regulations prohibiting all uses are not permitted (see notes 89-91 and accompany-
ing text infra); yet total prohibition of development is often desirable where wildlife
preservation and other environmental objectives are sought.
57. For example, FLA. STAT. § 380.05(17) (1975) limits the acreage that can be de-
signated areas of critical state concern to 5% of the land of the state. Lands acquired
through eminent domain would not come under this limitation.
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bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.58 All property is held subject to the police power of
the state.59 Since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,60 courts have
held that zoning regulations limiting land uses are not confiscatory
even if they substantially reduce property value. 61 Mere decrease in
value is not conclusive evidence of a taking or otherwise grounds for
compensation to the landowner; in Euclid the property value was re-
duced from $10,000 to $2,500 per acre. 62
Courts have upheld regulations exercising the police power even
when they prohibit uses already being made and render existing de-
velopments worthless. 63 They have also sustained prohibitions on all
uses of certain portions of a landowner's property, such as are caused
by beach setback lines.6 4
Land use regulations must be within the substantive authority
granted the particular agency by its enabling act. To be upheld, a
regulation generally must benefit the entire population rather than
58. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
59. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
60. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, a village zoning ordinance regulated and restricted
the location of trades, industries, apartment houses, lot sizes, building heights, etc. Ambler
Realty sought an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance because the ordinance
greatly reduced the value of Ambler's land. Ambler alleged that the ordinance con-
fiscated and destroyed a great part of the land's value and deterred prospective buyers
from purchasing the land. Id. at 384-85. The Court looked only to see whether the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power authority. Establishing that it was, the
Court refused to grant the injunction. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the
extent of Ambler's loss since the injuries complained of were merely speculative and
not actually suffered.
61. Id. at 368, citing argument for appellants. See also State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110
So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959).
62, 272 U.S, at 384.
63. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). The land in question
was a bed of clay which had long been used for the manufacture of bricks. The land
was worth $800,000 ($100,000/acre) as a brickyard and only $60,000 if used for any other
purpose, and it was totally unsuited for other uses because of deep excavations. Yet
the United States Supreme Court upheld a Los Angeles ordinance making it a mis-
demeanor to establish or operate a brickyard within the city. See also Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887), where state legislation prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating
liquors was upheld even though it made Mugler's brewery property decrease in value
from $10,000 to $2,500. Webster Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Miami, 256 So. 2d 556 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972), is in accord with the above cases. In most cases, however, a
landowner will be permitted to continue such nonconforming uses of land and structures
as were in existence at the time of the adoption of the regulations on the theory that it
would be an injustice and unreasonable hardship to compel immediate removal of pre-
existing structures or suppression of an otherwise lawful established business. Fortunato
v. Coral Gables, 47 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1950).
64. See McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1953); Spiegle v.
Beach Haven, 218 A.2d 129 (N.J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
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a special interest group; 5 statewide or regional regulations have had
more success in court than local regulations. 6 It has been suggested that
courts are more apt to uphold regulations if they prevent some type of
harm.67 Such a conclusion is probably based on the tort concept that a
landowner may not use his property in a manner that is harmful to
others. 68
B. Regulations in Conjunction with Eminent Domain
As mentioned above,69 existing land use regulations preventing the
"highest and best" use of land are relevant in determining the reason-
able use of the property for eminent domain valuation purposes."0
In addition, improvements made in violation of existing regulations
are not compensable; 71 the landowner has a right to engage in and
be compensated for only those uses which the law allows.72
Where regulations limit or prohibit land uses, the jury considers
the effect of the restrictions along with the probability that the parcel
will be rezoned for other uses or that the regulation will be repealed
in the foreseeable future.73 Prohibited uses can be considered only if
there is a reasonable probability that the regulation will be changed
or an exception made.74 This rule gives government the ability to re-
duce market values in an area considered for eminent domain simply
by inhibiting development through zoning.75 There are, however, limi-
tations to that power. Courts generally strike restrictive land use regu-
lations where there is clear evidence that the authorities have imposed
the regulations to prevent improvements on land destined for con-
demnation.76 Such regulations are held invalid as arbitrary, discrimina-
65. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 51, at 199.
66. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972);
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
67. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511 (1904).
68. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.4 (1956).
69. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
70. See note 48 supra. See also Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 182
So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
71. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 175(1) (1965).
72. Id.
73. See Swift & Co. v. Housing Authority, 106 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1958), citing 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN, § 34 (2d ed. 1953); Board of
Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 100 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1958); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 160(f) (1965).
74. Langston v. Miami Beach, 242 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
75. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 47-48 (1964).
76. See Board of Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co.,
108 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958). See also Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging
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tory, and unreasonable. In one Florida case, state and local officials
imposed strict zoning regulations to prevent expensive improvements
on land which would ultimately be condemned. 77 The court found
that the zoning ordinance, if literally applied, would result in an
arbitrary and unreasonable restraint on the use of property. It noted
that since the ordinance was arbitrary, it probably would be changed in
the future; 7 it therefore held that the jury should have been allowed to
consider prohibited uses in determining compensation. The court
stated:
It appears to us that it would be totally unjustifiable to hold that
the condemning authority could rely on the restrictive provisions of
a zoning ordinance to depress land values and in the same litigation
deny to the property owner an opportunity to defend himself and
his property against the asserted ordinance on the ground of its
alleged invalidity.79
C. Regulations in Place of Eminent Domain
As courts have limited the use of regulations in conjunction with
eminent domain, they have also limited the extent of regulations used
in place of eminent domain. A regulation too restrictive will be deemed
a taking.8 0
The dominant standard for determining whether a regulation
amounts to a taking of land is the "diminution of value" test established
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.s In that case, Justice Holmes
balanced the public benefit of the state action against the landowner's
economic loss. 2 Under this test, when the diminution in property
value reaches a certain level, eminent domain must be exercised and
compensation afforded. 3 In the 54 years since Pennsylvania Coal was
by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1970).
77. Board of Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108
So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958). After the state announced plans to acquire five
downtown Tallahassee parcels as part of the proposed Capitol Center, the city of
Tallahassee rezoned the area to residential use only. Id. at 79. Evidence was presented
that the state planner had recommended the imposition of municipal zoning regulations
to prohibit construction of business and commercial buildings on the private property
contemplated for the project. See also Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. App. 1970).
78. 108 So. 2d at 82-83.
79. Id. at 81.
80. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 413.
83. Id. See also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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decided, the line between regulation and taking has remained vague;
no generally accepted numerical limit exists regarding what diminution
is allowable without compensation. 8 4
Courts have found other classes of regulations to amount to a taking.
These include regulations which result in private land becoming a
public facility 5 and those which discriminate against particular parcels
of land. 6 In making the latter determination, courts look to see if
the regulations are applied to certain properties differently than to
other land similarly situated,' 7 or if they prohibit uses which are al-
lowed to be made of surrounding or nearby land.88
Courts nearly always find a taking where the ordinance or regula-
tion completely deprives an owner of any beneficial use or the only
use for which the land is suited.8 9 The key to that rule is the phrase
84. See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 51, at 208-09; Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928).
85. See, e.g., Baker v. Planning Bd., 228 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1967). In this case the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a planning board could not restrict
land uses by refusing to approve subdivision plans so that the town could continue to
use the owner's land as the town's water storage area.
86. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In Mugler, legislation prohibiting the
manufacture of alcoholic beverages affected only those parcels of land having breweries
or distilleries on them.
87. Mayer v. Dade County, 82 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1955). Here the court said that Dade
County had "singled out" the particular parcel in question for an unusual application
of its building setback line requirement. According to the zoning ordinance involved,
buildings on property abutting public roads had to be 25 feet from the road's edge.
The county had indefinite plans to widen the road adjacent to appellant's property and
wanted to measure the setback based on the proposed street but the Supreme Court of
Florida rejected the county's position. Id. at 519.
88. William Murray Builders, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 254 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1971). Appellant wanted to build an apartment complex on property that
was restricted to single family dwellings. The First District Court of Appeal found
that the zoning ordinance as applied to appellant's property was arbitrary and unreason-
able since the property surrounding appellant's land contained railroad yards, a con-
venience store, a gasoline station, a large apartment complex, and a sewage disposal system.
Id. at 366-67.
89. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964);
Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1941). In Dooley, a zoning change made
the plaintiff's property part of a flood plain district and restricted uses to:
1. Parks, playgrounds, marinas, boat houses, landings and docks, clubhouses and
necessary uses.
2. Wildlife sanctuaries operated by governmental units or non-profit organizations.
3. Farming, truck and nursery gardening.
4. Motor vehicle parking as an accessory to a permitted use in this district or an
adjacent district.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that the regulation was confiscatory.
197 A.2d at 771 n.l.
In Forde, a Miami Beach zoning ordinance restricted appellant's vacant oceanfront
property to single residences. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that enforcement of the
ordinance and refusal to permit appellant to build a hotel or apartment building on the
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"only use for which the land is suited." Most jurisdictions have held
that a regulation requires compensation as a taking if it prohibits all
reasonable uses."0 Courts generally invalidate zoning enactments which
cause property to be unimproved or lie idle for an indeterminable
time.9 '
Under the majority view, a regulation can validly deprive the own-
er of the most profitable use, but cannot be sustained if it deprives
him of all practical uses,9 2 even if the land in question is a flood plain"
or wetlands.9 4 Other courts, however, have upheld regulations which
absolutely prohibit residential or commercial structures on flood
plains 5 or limit uses to parks, recreation and agriculture,9 6 as well as
wetlands acts which severely limit land uses.97 In this area, just as with
eminent domain valuation procedures, changing public attitudes toward
unrestrained development probably will have a significant impact on
the law.
VI. THE IMPLICATION OF Just v. Marinette County
A much-discussed9 s 1972 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, just v.
Marinette County,99 suggests a mechanism by which wetlands, and per-
haps other areas in which the public has an interest, can be strictly
land was unreasonable because it would cause the land to remain unimproved and un-
productive for an unpredictable period. 1 So. 2d at 647. The court reasoned that be-
cause sea walls and refilling were required before appellant's land could be developed,
individual home builders could not bear the necessary expenses and would never develop
it.
90. Florida is no exception. See, e.g., Ocean Villa Apartments, Inc. v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 70 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1954). In this case, the building setback requirement
of a zoning ordinance limited the landowner's useful area to a depth of 17 feet. The
Supreme Court of Florida hinted that this may have left no reasonable uses open to
the landowner but found it unnecessary to decide that issue. Id. at 903.
91. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 220 A.2d
97 (N.J. 1966). In this case, the Catholic Diocese wanted to build a high school on land
zoned R-1. After acquisition of the land, the municipality amended the zoning ordinance
to prohibit schools in R-1 districts. The court held that this did not zone the area into
idleness.
92. See Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770, 774 (Conn. 1964), and
cases cited therein.
93. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 197 A.2d 770 (Conn. 1964).
94. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963).
95. See Turner v. County of Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. App. 1972).
96. Id. at 95.
97. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
98. See, e.g., 86 HARV. L. REa. 1582 (1973); 4 SEroN HALL L. REV. 662 (1973); 27 ARK.
L. REv. 527 (1973). See also F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 51, at 217-21, 295.
99. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
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regulated without compensation to landowners. The court held that
a land regulation can be valid even if it restricts owners to "natural
uses" of land. 00 That holding permits more extensive land use con-
trol than the "reasonable use" test just described. 1 1
The Just court distinguished between "natural" and "nonnatural"
uses of property; it said that compensation is necessary only when all
natural uses are prohibited. The opinion stated that a landowner "has
no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was un-
suited in its natural state . "... 102 The court defined "natural uses" as
those requiring minimal artificial filling, draining, or other develop-
ment.
0 3
The Just court used the "diminution of value" test to determine
whether the regulation constituted a taking, but ignored the land's
development potential and compared the land's regulated value to its
value in a natural state . 4 This land valuation method might be applied
in other regulation cases and could be used in eminent domain pro-
ceedings. The potential impact of the Just decision warrants further
discussion.
Marinette County had a shoreline zoning ordinance that required
a permit for all but a very limited number of uses.10 5 The regulation
100. Id. at 768.
101. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
102. 201 N.W.2d at 768.
103. id. The Just definition of "natural use" appears stricter than that used in
other areas of the law. In an early nuisance case, for example, "natural use and enjoy-
ment" of property was defined as:
• .. such development of its resources, and such customary and appropriate em-
ployment of the property itself, as is needful for its complete utilization, accord-
ing to its inherent qualities or contents and its surrounding, and does not include,
in any other case, the bringing upon it artificially of substances not naturally found
there.
Evans v. Reading Chem. & Fertilizing Co., 28 A. 702, 705 (Pa. 1894).
104. Chief Justice Hallows explained:
The Justs argue their property has been severely depreciated in value. But
this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the land in its natural
state but on what the land would be worth if it could be filled and used for the
location of a dwelling. While loss of value is to be considered in determining
whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon changing the
character of the land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an essential
factor or controlling.
201 N.W.2d at 771.
105. The Just court cited Marinette County, Wis., Ordinance 24, § 3.41, Sept. 19,
1967, which allowed the following uses without a permit:
(1) Harvesting of any wild crop such as marsh hay, ferns, moss, wild rice,
berries, tree fruits and tree seeds.
(2) Sustained yield forestry subject to the provisions of Section 5.0 relating
to removal of shore cover.
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was patterned after a model ordinance published by the Wisconsin
Department of Resource Development based on legislation1 0 6 authoriz-
ing counties to adopt zoning ordinances regulating the use of shore-
lands.107 The Justs owned "shoreland" under the regulation.
The county told the Justs that the ordinance forbade their already-
begun land filling. It sought an injunction to prevent the Justs from
placing fill material on their property without obtaining a permit;
the Justs sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was un-
constitutional.
The Justs argued that the ordinance, by prohibiting them from
placing fill on wetlands property, amounted to a taking of land without
compensation. °" The Wisconsin Supreme Court answered that filling
was not a "natural use" of a swamp and that such filling created a
public harm.10 9 The court also found that since the ordinance did not
prohibit natural and indigenous uses, it was a constitutional exercise
of the state's police power. 10
The court distinguished restrictions intended to restrain conduct
harmful to the public from those designed to secure a public benefit
(3) Utilities such as, but not restricted to, telephone, telegraph and power
transmission lines.
(4) Hunting, fishing, preservation of scenic, historic and scientific areas and
wildlife preserves.
(5) Non-resident buildings used solely in conjunction with raising water
fowl, minnows, and other similar lowland animals, fowl or fish.
(6) Hiking trails and bridle paths.
(7) Accessory uses.
(8) Signs, subject to the restriction of Section 2.0.
Section 3.42 of the ordinance required a conditional use permit for the following:
(1) General farming provided farm animals shall be kept one hundred feet
from any non-farm residence.
(2) Dams, power plants, flowages and ponds.
(3) Relocation of any water course.
(4) Filling, drainage or dredging of wetlands according to the provisions of
Section 5.0 of this ordinance.
(5) Removal of top soil or peat.
(6) Cranberry bogs.
(7) Piers, Docks, boathouses.
201 N.W.2d at 765-66 n.4.
106. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 59.971 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
107. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975), defines "shorelands" as "all
lands . . . in . . . unincorporated areas within the following distances from the normal
high-water elevation of navigable waters . . . . 1,000 feet from a lake, pond or flowage;
300 feet from a river or stream or to the landward side of the flood plain, whichever
distance is greater."
108. 201 N.W.2d at 770.
109. Id. at 768.
110. Id.
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not presently enjoyed. Only in the latter case must the state compensate
the landowner for a decrease in value caused by the restriction.1 1'
Other courts have since followed the public harm/public benefit
dichotomy.
112
Environmental protection can either secure a new public benefit
or prevent public harm; the Just court viewed it as the latter, and
therefore required no compensation., 1 3 According to the court, the
ordinance prevented harm by restricting unnatural uses, since "swamps
and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of
nature and are essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and
streams. ' 1 4 It found that the ordinance obtained no new benefits and
only preserved something already the public's by right.
1 1 5
Under the Just decision a restriction is not a taking if it prohibits
an unnatural use which would harm the land's natural characteristics
and adversely affect the public. 1 6 If the court finds that a public harm
will result unless the land remains in its natural state, it will measure
the landowner's economic loss as the value of the natural and indigenous
uses of the land-the most profitable use is irrelevant.
Whether Just will result in more courts accepting stricter environ-
mental regulation without compensation is not clear. Navigable waters
were involved in Just; public rights concerning lands adjacent to such
waters are fairly well established." 7 The decision can be extended to
forests and other areas or limited to navigable waters. The Just court
provided no specific guidelines as to what constitutes a "natural use."
The ambiguity of the term allows for a due process notice challenge:
What are the "natural uses" of a beach, a forest, or a lake?
To date, most states have not adopted the "natural use" approach.
Generally, the application of the Pennsylvania Coal "diminution of
value" test to Just-type regulations, which seek to keep wetlands in
their natural state, results in their being declared confiscatory."" Courts
have held that prohibiting fill amounts to a taking unless the filled
11. Id. at 767.
112. See, e.g., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. 1970).
113. 201 N.W. 2d at 767. The Pennsylvania Coal diminution of value test is usually
used only when the regulation in question provides a public benefit. It could be argued
that the two tests-benefit or harm-are in reality identical. The Just court may have
decided against compensation first and then used the prevention of harm rationale to
justify that decision.
114. 201 N.W.2d at 768.
115. Id. at 767-68.
116. Note that not all nonnatural uses are harmful.
117. 201 N.W.2d at 769. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1-1175 (1970).
118. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Im-
provement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963). -.
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land would have no value whatsoever;"" yet Just has not been ignored.
A California court sustained a regulation proscribing wetlands filling
upon strong evidence of ecological danger. 120 Wisconsin courts have
followed Just,'21 and one Florida court has cited it.122 Florida's growing
concern with environmental control and wetlands in particular make it
likely that the state's courts will take a closer look at the Just case.
VII. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE FUTURE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Three interrelated trends are shaping the future course of environ-
mental eminent domain: (1) increasing judicial willingness to uphold
stricter land use regulations, as evidenced by the Just decision; (2)
more landowner challenges to those regulations; and (3) broader and
more frequent governmental exercise of eminent domain. More ex-
tensive regulation may lessen the need for outright purchases of private
land for environmental control, but there is a growing landowner de-
mand for more compensation. Authorities are responding by seeking
to increase the use of eminent domain.1 23
A. Stronger Land Use Regulations
Historically, courts have more strictly scrutinized land use regula-
tions than other regulations.12 4 But judicial attitudes are changing
toward exercises of the police power for environmental objectives.125
Courts are becoming more willing to support state and regional land
regulation programs and to uphold stricter environmental controls; 12 6
they are giving more weight to environmental purposes as balanced
119. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
120. See Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. 1970). See also Blumenfeld v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 117 Cal. Rptr. 327 (Ct. App. 1974).
121. Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734, 743 (Wis. 1974) (a statute prohibiting di-
verting water from streams for irrigational purposes was found to be a legitimate exercise
of state police power to prevent possible harm to the public); Kmiec v. Town of Spider
Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973) (the zoning ordinance limiting use to agriculture was
found inconsistent with the natural characteristics of the land).
122. Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Comm'n v. Frandorson Proper-
ties, 283 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The court said that "the Legislature
possesses the power, in order to promote the quality of our environment, to forbid the
destruction of the mangrove area even by a landowner upon his own property." Id. at 68.
123. See note 25 supra.
124. See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 51, at 238.
125. Id. at 212.
126. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal.
1971); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md. 1972); In
re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
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against private losses, and liberally construing statutes dealing with
the protection of natural resources.l 7
Eventually, some environmental purposes may outweigh any loss;12s
the prohibition of uses resembling common law nuisances has neared
that status already. 2 9 Courts in a few states, including Wisconsin and
California, are beginning to find such important environmental reasons
for wetlands control that they uphold proscriptions against filling as
within the police power." 0 As values change, the criteria for "reason-
able" land use regulations will change. Courts may find reason in strict-
er limitations such as the "natural uses" restriction of Just, and sustain
more ordinances against constitutional attack.
Another development may strengthen the government's position in
land use regulation cases. Courts are increasingly viewing regulations
as not just quantitatively, but qualitatively different from eminent
domain.' 31 With this perspective, as long as the public benefit received
outweighs the private loss, the regulation is valid; mere reduction in
land value is insufficient to justify holding a regulation to be a taking." 2
Statutory standards could eliminate confusion over the line between
taking and regulation.' 3 3 In the past, courts have deferred to reasonable
legislative attempts to define that line.2 4
B. Opposition to Regulation
The proliferation of strict environmental land use regulations is a
fairly recent phenomenon; organized resistance to far reaching regula-
127. This favored position was noted in Blumenfeld v. San Francisco Bay Conserva-
tion and Dev. Comm'n, 117 Cal. Rptr. 327 (Ct. App. 1974):
It has also been stated that laws providing for the conservation of natural resources
are of great public and remedial importance and thus, are given a liberal construc-
tion.
See 3 SOUTnERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 71.14 (4th ed. 1974).
128. See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 51, at 256. The authors of THE TAKING ISSUE feel
that in practice the courts have made an exception to the balancing test when a regula-
tion is designed to prevent a land use so harmful to the public safety or health that it
presents a serious and immediate danger. In those cases the value to the public is so
heavily weighted as to overbalance any loss to the property owner. They suggest that as
awareness increases of the adverse ecological consequences of many more types of land
uses, more types of land use regulations might be given this "heavyweight" status.
129. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). Here a town
ordinance prohibited excavations below the water table because they filled with water
and became safety hazards. See also Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
130. See notes 99, 120 supra.
131. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 51, at 266-83.
132. Id. at 269.
133. Id. at 266-67.
134. Id.
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tions is just now mobilizing. Stories of the burdens of over-regulated
and unmarketable property have angered land owners. Governments
have responded to this growing opposition by seeking a more equitable
balance between property rights and land use regulation. The
Governor's Property Rights Study Commission"' was an attempt to
devise ways to achieve that balance.
As ecological problems multiply and increase the urgency of en-
vironmental protection, the balance becomes more difficult to main-
tain; in many cases it becomes impossible. Governments can either
ignore the imbalance and attempt to compromise constitutionally
guaranteed property rights, or try to use eminent domain to provide
compensation. Increased opposition to regulation will result in greater
pressures on governments to provide compensation.
C. Changes in the Eminent Domain Concept
and Methods of Compensation
As noted, public officials have responded to the opposition to strict
regulation by seeking to expand the government's authority to use
eminent domain for environmental reasons.13 Existing statutes limit-
ing the exercise of eminent domain are narrowly construed, and ex-
pansion of condemnation authority usually requires new legislation.1 3 7
In the future, governments will probably have broader condemna-
tion powers to effectuate environmental objectives. The extent to
which governments will exercise those powers is unpredictable. Strict
land use regulation without compensation will remain government's
basic environmental tool, but condemnation will probably be used
more than in the past, especially where special circumstances would
make regulation unfair. For example, regulations may be effective in
preventing development and preserving land in its natural state, but
they cannot validly be used to turn private lands into public facili-
ties . 3 8
The major objections to increased exercise of environmental
eminent domain are based on the enormous finances needed and the
attendant potential for wasteful spending. The president of the 1975
Florida Senate voiced this concern when he announced the appoint-
ment of a special senate committee to investigate the use of funds set
aside to purchase environmentally endangered lands. 39
135. See note 9 supra.
136. See note 25 supra.
137. See, e.g., note 7 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 85 supra.
139. According to the senate president:
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Along with a probable increase in the use of environmental condem-
nation, the nature of the eminent domain concept itself will continue
to change. Some of the likely changes are directly related to the inter-
relationship of eminent domain and land use regulation discussed
above.140
Since a landowner's compensation for condemned land is based in
part on use regulations,' court endorsements of more severe land use
restrictions may result in lower purchase prices for the government.
Where regulation has limited a landowner to "natural uses," his com-
pensation would be the value of the land in its natural state with no
consideration of development potential. Further, it is possible that
the Just value formula for diminution purposes-limiting the value to
natural uses-would be used to determine compensation in all cases
where the government finds an environmental need to preserve lands,
even if no use regulation exists.142 No court has taken that approach yet,
but it is the next logical step after Just.
Compensable regulations have been suggested as an alternative
system.1 43 Under this method, landowners are compensated for strict
regulations that severely limit property use; payment can be by cash,
by tax credits, or by expansion of property rights on other land.144
As discussed in the next section, the Governor's Property Rights Study
Commission recommended this approach.
Two basic systems of compensable regulations are presently in
use. Several states use a modified system. They authorize an agency
to make regulations and to exercise eminent domain only when the
courts decide that the regulations are not a constitutional exercise of
police power.1 45 Compensation is determined on a lot-by-lot basis as
litigated; unlitigated cases remain subject to the regulations without
compensation. The stricter the regulation, the more likely the land-
Florida for the first time in its history is involved in the purchase of swamps,
and some of that is needed.
I'm afraid, however, that nobody has sat down to try to put a value on
swamps, and I'm afraid the people of Florida have been taken in a rather severe
way on the waste of money in that regard.
Tallahassee Democrat, June 6, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
140. See notes 54-97 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 48, 70, 71, 73-79 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 104 supra.
143. See F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 51, at 302-09. See generally Note, Compensable
Regulations: Outline of a New Land Use Planning Tool, 10 WILLAMETrE L.J. 451 (1974).-
144. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Ur-
ban Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1972).
145. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (1974); N.J. REv. STAT. § 13:9A-6
(1974). This is the approa~ch espoused by the drafters of the American Law Institute's
Model Land Development Code.
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owner is to go to court for compensation. This system of compensable
regulations has been defined as " 'a method of validating land use regu-
lations that are so restrictive ... that the courts would hold the regu-
lations invalid in the absence of compensation paid to the land own-
er.' "146 The second compensable regulation approach is to compensate
landowners for diminished use even though the regulation responsible
may not be an unconstitutional taking. A recent Oregon proposal would
compensate property owners for loss of value in excess of 20 percent
based on pre- and post-regulated market value.
147
Other possible methods of compensation include purchasing less
than the fee simple (long-term leases, for example), government sub-
sidies or tax advantages for "environmentally desirable" uses, and land
swapping. Another method is payments by governments of nuisance
damages for use of land or restriction of its use through regulation.1 48
Finally, authorities may be able to avoid compensation by seeking
more injunctions against nuisance-type uses, especially as new, broader
definitions of "nuisance" develop based on environmental considera-
tions.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA
PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY COMMISSION
On March 17, 1975, the Governor's Property Rights Study Com-
mission released its finding after a 10-week study of land use regula-
tion and taking. 49 After reviewing background materials and Florida
contested land use regulation cases, the Commission focused on the
possibility of compensation where property value is substantially
diminished by stringent environmental regulations. 5 It examined
the two compensable regulation approaches discussed in the previous
section of this note' 5 ' and chose the "Oregon" approach. 52
The Commission made its recommendations in the following policy
statements:
146. PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, citing NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON URBAN PROBLEMS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 15, ALTERNATIVES TO URBAN SPRAWL: LEGAL
GUIDELINES FOR GOVERNMENTAL AcTION 27 (1968).
147. PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, citing OREGON EXECUTIVE DE-
PARTMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS DIVISION, INROADS TOWARD POSITIVE LAND USE
MANAGEMENT: A LAND VALUE ADJUSTMENT PROPOSAL, August 29, 1975.
148. See generally Note, Nuisance Damages as an Alternative to Compensation of
Land Use Restrictions in Eminent Domain, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 998 (1974).
149. PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 10.
150. Id. at 2-3.
151. Id. at 3-5. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text supra.
152. Id. at 6.
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Policy Statement No. 1
A system should be provided whereby compensation is paid
for any regulation that unduly diminishes the value of property,
even though it does not constitute an unconstitutional taking
without compensation. 153
Policy Statement No. 2
Any system of compensable regulation should allow regulating
governments an opportunity to modify, rescind or grant a
variance in lieu of compensation. Such options should, however,
be required to be exercised within a reasonable time, because
delay itself can cause damage to the property owner.15 4
Policy Statement No. 3
Diminution of pre-regulation market value that exceeds a cer-
tain threshold should be compensated. 5
Policy Statement No. 4
Compensation or other relief should be determined by judicial
proceeding rather than by administrative proceeding. 5 6
Policy Statement No. 5
Any system of statewide compensable regulation should speak to
all governmentally imposed regulations. 157
Policy Statement No. 6
Any system of statewide compensable regulation should not pre-
clude existing methods of compensation. 15s
Policy Statement No. 7
The state should be granted the power to acquire environmentally
endangered lands through exercise of the power of eminent do-
main, but only if accompanied by a more specific statutory defini-
tion of environmentally endangered lands. 159
In addition to the seven policies above, the Commission concluded
that property damage caused by a government agency's failure to make
a timely decision should be compensable. 160 It suggested the establish-
ment of a voluntary public council to hear complaints regarding mal-
administration of state regulations and to advise the Governor or legis-
lature.' 61
153. Id. (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id. (footnote ommitted). No threshold percentage was recommended.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Statement No. 6 is designed to assure that existing inverse condemnation
remedies and eminent domain provisions will not be eliminated by any new program.
159. Id. at 9. This policy was put into limited statutory form and passed by the
legislature 2 months after the Commission's report was issued. See note 6 supra.
160. PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 10, at 6.
161. ld. at 10.
EMINENT DOMAIN
In its final policy statement, the Commission urged that more study
is needed and unanimously recommended that its own efforts con-
tinue:
Policy Statement No. 8
The work of the Governor's Property Rights Study Commission
should be continued by the same or a similar group, for at least
an additional twelve months with adequate funding.16 2
The Commission's recommendations appear to strike at the major
problems of both environmental eminent domain and land use regula-
tion. Compensation for specifically forbidden land uses would almost
always be less than traditional eminent domain compensation. The
state probably could afford to compensate landowners for strict regula-
tion even where vast areas of land are involved; condemnation and
purchase in such cases would be tec- costly. Since total market value
would not be the formula used, improvements on the land would not
greatly affect compensation. Extensive development would be less
likely to take property out of the state's price range, and the state
would be less likely to pay for unwanted improvements. Also, under
the proposed system more property would remain owned by private
citizens and on the tax rolls than under outright purchase through
condemnation.
Compensation for regulation would lessen the resistance to needed
environmental legislation. In addition to removing the landowners'
main objection to regulation-that it lowers land value without compen-
sation-such regulations would withstand legal attacks which have de-
feated noncompensable regulations. For example, one probably could
not argue that such a regulation is too restrictive because it greatly
diminishes value, is applied unequally to similarly situated lands,
makes private property a public facility, or deprives an owner of all
suitable land uses. Varying amounts of compensation could cure all
these apparent injustices.
The system would require less strained judicial reasoning over
whether a regulation amounts to a taking. That elusive distinction
would no longer determine whether a landowner is compensated or
financially ruined.
A potential problem with the recommended system would be to
select a fair threshold diminution level that compensates for bona
fide injury yet allows the state to exercise wide-scale control without
undue expense. A threshold that is too high would merely perpetuate
162. Id. at 11.
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the present regulation/taking controversy; a threshold that is too low
would make the system financially impossible.
The apparent advantages of the Commission's recommended system
demand that serious attention be given the feasibility of its implemen-
tation. Before it can be completely evaluated, the system must be
more fully researched and defined. Inadequate funding has presently
stopped this effort. The next move is clearly the legislature's.
IX. CONCLUSION
Increasing environmental awareness is changing society's values.
Lands once thought worthless are now considered ecologically vital;
many uses which before were generally accepted as a landowner's
prerogative are now viewed as harmful. 163 Since all legal concepts
change to reflect society's shifting values, the tremendous rise in en-
vironmental concern will continue to significantly affect the future of
eminent domain.
In addition, as the interest in ecology gains momentum, the number
of judicial decisions and legislative acts in the environmental area will
continue to increase. This stepped-up activity will speed the meta-
morphosis of environmental eminent domain and land use regulation.
The pressures building in this area cannot be ignored. Legislatures
and courts must make a concerted effort to establish an equitable and
workable environmental eminent domain policy. Environmental,
budgetary, and property rights issues need study. Governments must
define the parameters of when, where, and how eminent domain or
some alternative compensation system will be used. The dissent in a
recent California case'8 4 explained the necessary balance:
In the equation between private expectancies and public use a
balance must be struck which will allow the private owner adequate
compensation for what he has irretrievably and categorically lost
and at the same time permit the public to move against critical
environmental problems without being saddled with exorbitant
costs that could foreclose effective action.165
Accomplishing this balance requires further efforts such as those of
the Property Rights Study Commission. As previously mentioned, the
Commission itself recommended continuing its operations, 6' and
163. See, e.g., 201 N.W.2d at 768.
164. Community Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 116 Cal. Rptr. 308 (Ct. App.
1974).
165. Id. at 316.
166. PROPERTY RiGwrs REPORT, supra note 10, at 11. See note 162 supra.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Governor Askew has asked the legislature for additional funds for
that purpose.167 The feasibility of implementing the Commission's com-
pensable regulation recommendations should be given careful con-
sideration. 68
Many of the changes in the environmental eminent domain area
probably will originate in Florida and neighboring states. As Chief
Judge Brown of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit wrote in Zabel v. Tabb:
It is the destiny of the Fifth Circuit to be in the middle of great,
oftentimes explosive issues of spectacular public importance. So it is
here as we enter in depth the contemporary interest in the preserva-
tion of our environment. 169
KARL JEFFERY REYNOLDS
167. Tallahassee Democrat, Apr. 8, 1975, at 3, col. i. Continuation of the Property
Rights Study Commission was requested in Fla. S. 382 (1975) (and companion Fla. H.R.
900 (1975)). Fla. S. 382 (1975) was passed by the legislature May 28, 1975, but was vetoed
by Governor Askew June 19, 1975, because funds had not been appropriated.
168. The Commission recognized the need for a reliable revenue source for funding the
compensable regulation program as the most significant issue relative to feasibility.
PROPERTY RIGHTs REPORT, supra note 10, at 8.
169. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910 (1971).
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